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THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY PRIMACY OF 
STATUTORY LAW 
Albert Tate, Jr.* 
DEALING WITH STATUTES. By James Willard Hurst. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 1982. Pp. viii, 140. $15. 
A legal professional - practitioner, judge, or academic - tends to fo-
cus research and reasoning upon judicial decisions. Even if the issue con-
cerns the application of a statute, usually the exposition primarily relates to 
the enactment as refracted through prior cases interpreting and applying it. 
Partly this is due to our Anglo-American legal heritage, where, prior to the 
twentieth century, law primarily (?Volved through the decisions that were 
the foundation and fabric of the common law. The case method of instruc-
tion, common to our legal training, perhaps contributes to this persisting 
concentration on the development of legal principle in judicial decisions. 
Similarly, constraints of stare decisis often pragmatically require us to look 
first at the cases interpreting a statute rather than to the statute itself for its 
meaning and present application. 
Professor James Willard Hurst's .Dealing with Statutes is a thoughtful 
analysis of the central importance of statutory law in the twentieth-century 
United States. The three essays comprising this relatively brief work1 -
"Legislative Process," "The Interpretation of Statutes," and "The Constitu-
tionality of Statutes" - do not attempt to do more than present a broad 
overview of the role of statutory law and of judicial interaction therewith. 
Fundamental principles are restated with insight, and critical points of pos-
sible dysfunction are perceptively noted. Most probably, these theoretical 
propositions, critiques and insights have previously been stated elsewhere 
by Professor Hurst and others, but the importance of .Dealing with Statutes 
lies in its having concentrated in intense and brief focus the central modern-
day issues of legislative function and of judicial function with regard to 
legislation. The truths it speaks may be self-evident, but I, at least, recog-
nized some of them as self-evident only after Hurst's skillful and scholarly 
analysis. 
The first essay, "Legislative Process," affords penetrating insight into the 
fundamental essence of legislative power, including its unique and perva-
sively controlling role in affording social catharsis and regulation for the 
* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, New Orleans, 
Louisiana. 
I. The essays in the work were derived from the 1982 James S. Carpentier Lectures deliv-
ered at Columbia University by the author, who is the Vilas Professor of Law at the University 
of Wisconsin. Professor Hurst is also the author of several important works on the social 
history of law, including: THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW (1950); LAW AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH (1964); LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER IN THE UNITED STATES (1970); A LEGAL HISTORY 
OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1774-1970 (1973); THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS 
CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970 (1970). 
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ever more complex and congested society of twentieth-century America. In-
itially, Hurst notes that "[c]entral to the practical importance of legislative 
process is the range of jurisdiction of legislatures over parties and subject 
matter" (p. 2), especially as contrasted with the limits of initiative in law-
making that hedge executive and judicial agencies. ''The open-door princi-
ple governing legislative jurisdiction gains emphasis from the fact that there 
are almost no judicially enforceable procedural limits on how the legisla-
ture does its business" (p. 3) - what facts it does or does not hear, what 
subject matter it does or does not consider, what notice or opportunity to 
rebut it does or does not give. Hurst summarizes: 
[W]ith all the limitations, imposed by the realities of unequal means, 
knowledge, and skill of petitioners, the open-door character of legislative 
jurisdiction has given a distinctive place to legislative process. In the coun-
try's experience statute law has had special importance in giving content to 
public policy and adapting the legal social order to changing currents of 
interest and circumstances. [P. 4.] 
The first essay analyzes the ''unique array of legislative powers" (!.e., 
defining standards and rules; taxing, borrowing, and spending; creating new 
forms of governmental and private organization; and investigating) and of-
fers a perceptive but brief historical perspective on the changing use of 
these powers in performing the legislative role from our nation's earliest 
days to the present. He also reminds us that, due to the roles of legislative 
oversight and budget committees, "legislation is in important measure a 
continuing process" (p. 17). The statutes themselves set limits on the juris-
diction and procedures i)f executive agencies, and "in large part . . . have 
set the terms on which judges may review the procedures and substance of 
executive and administrative action" (p. 17). Hurst points out that in mod-
ern America, "legislators and the executive and administrative officers in 
central and in local government to whom they delegated power produced a 
body of service and regulatory law that dwarfed the common law perform-
ance" (p. 27). 
The concluding portion of the first essay is in the nature of a paean to 
the central role of the legislative process - that process of harnessing col-
lective effort and balancing conflicting interests for the purposes of estab-
lishing both broad principles of public policy and also particulars of 
regulation essential to the vitality and social order of a constantly evolving 
society. Hurst concludes: 
The need to effect a proper balance between responsibilities to make gen-
eral policy, to respond by proper delegation to needs for more particular-
ized development of policy, and to exercise effective supervision of 
executive and administrative agencies, has posed constant challenges to 
twentieth-century legislators . . . . [T]he problems of relating general and 
particular policy are fixed firmly in the structure of the legal and social 
order. These problems will not go away. They present the principal chal-
lenge of the times to the conscience, skill, and experience of legislative 
lawmakers. [Pp. 28-29.] 
The second essay, ''The Interpretation of Statutes," while maintaining 
the broad philosophical perspective of the first, addresses more mundane 
and practical concerns, as indicated by the essay's subheadings: ''The In-
tention of the Legislature," "Legislation as Product of a Continuing Pro-
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cess," "Form and Substance in Statute Law," and "Rules of Construction." 
The essay is not, however, a trite restatement of prior propositions or de-
bates but rather, in this reviewer's opinion, an original and forceful exposi-
tion of the few most central and controlling principles that, explicitly or not, 
motivate the approach of a twentieth-century American court in assigning 
meaning to and devising application of a statute. 
By way of introduction, Hurst rejects (for convincing reasons) the thesis 
of Max Radin2 and others that it is a judicial fiction to assign any specific 
legislative intent to the enactments of a multi-membered, often inattentive, 
committee-dominated legislature. First, while a legislature may not have 
particular applications in mind, legislation undoubtedly involves "general 
goals" and a "general range of means" (p. 36) directed at courts or other 
agencies to assist them in enforcing the statute and its ends. Second, while 
a "statute is normally the product of focused effort and detailed attention of 
a relatively few individuals," and while the "committee is the key work-
place of the legislature," the work product is, nevertheless, designed for ac-
ceptance by the entire body (p. 37). Although "normally the role of the 
general membership is a cautionary, residual one, [which promotes] respon-
sible work by the specialists," "the limited circle that works up the bill 
must make such choices and adjustments as they calculate will pass muster 
before the larger body or not unduly arouse opposition there" (p. 37). 
Professor Hurst rather eloquently concludes: 
[A] statute embodies a choice of values carrying obligations on those 
within its governance, backed by the force of the state. Under our constitu-
tional arrangement of official powers, legislators may legitimately thus set 
guiding or limiting frames of action for other people. Because the statute's 
function is to make authoritative value determinations, fulfillment of the 
function is impossible without inquiry as to what values and what order of 
values the legislators had in mind. Inevitably those who put statutes to use 
must exercise considerable discretionary judgment on specifics that the leg-
islators have not directly resolved. Also, they must exercise cautious wis-
dom in consulting materials outside the statutory text. But in the end the 
presence of the statute tells them that they deal with an area of public 
policy where not their value choices but those of a distinct body are to set 
the course. [P. 40.] 
It seems to me that few should disagree with these observations. 
I must add, however, that the problems of statutory interpretation most 
troublesome to me, as a federal appellate judge for the past three years, are 
not those arising from legislative wording or intention, but rather how a 
court, bound by stare decisis, can reconcile legislatively expressed intent 
with the judicial encrustations that have added dimension to the original 
enactment beyond those initially contemplated by its enacted wording.3 Of 
2. See Radin,A Short Way With Statutes, 56 HARV. L. REV. 388, 406-12 (1942); Radin, 
Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 869-72 (1930). 
3. See, e.g., United States v. M/V Big Sam, 681 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1982),petitionfor rehg. 
and suggestion far rehg. en bane denied per curiam, 693 F.2d 451, 452 (5th Cir. 1982), where 
application of a provision of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1265, 1281-1293, 1311-1328, 1341-1345, 1361-1376 (1978), was rather clearly 
expressed in unambiguous statutory language. Nevertheless, identical statutory language di-
rected at a different but related situation had previously been interpreted otherwise by a prior 
decision, and four judges dissented from the denial of an en bane rehearing in the view that 
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course, the brevity and breadth of the work precludes discussion of such 
particularized problems, as well as of the rather common situations where, 
in truth, there is no easily discernible legislative intent extending to unfore-
seeable circumstances that inevitably reach the court.4 
The remainder of this second essay on statutory interpretation is the 
best single treatment I have read of twentieth-century judicial approaches. 
Partly, perhaps, because of succinctness, Hurst's insights have crystallized 
my own gropings toward an articulated theory over twenty-eight years of 
appellate service. Hurst barely refers to the traditional maxims, which are 
in fact usually spoken of (if at all) as if they prescribed the result. Actually 
the often contradictory maxims merely help describe an asserted process of 
reasoning by which the judge, independently, has determined the proper 
meaning and application of the statute to the case before him. 5 
Having made his point as to the importance of acknowledging the crite-
rion of legislative intent, Hurst suggests that of second importance is "the 
need to recognize that if legislation becomes a living part of social experi-
ence typically it does so as the result of a continuing process, only part of 
which is represented by putting words into a statute book" (p. 40): "The 
statutory text is central and commands deference. But to grasp the full real-
ity of its impact we should see it as part ofa flow of policy-making activity" 
(p. 41). As he observes, modern-day courts do not regard legislation as an 
extraneous growth in the common law garden that needs cropping and 
weeding. Rather, in an effort to determine and enforce the legislative in-
tent, and responding to the changes in the legislative process in this century, 
today's courts tend to emphasize and give weight to four principal factors: 
(1) the particular legislative history of the enactment before it, with especial 
reference to legislative committee reports and floor-explanations and to 
amendments or changes in the bill between its introduction and enactment, 
but with appropriate credibility-discount as to other floor statements or 
committee testimony; (2) the pattern of succession of other statutory enact-
ments in the particular field, with the guidance as to the delineation of public 
policy and consequent interpretation of the present statute furnished by 
successive statutes over the years; (3) the bearing of general sectors of legisla-
tion on the meaning to be given a particular act, since "the content of public 
policy may grow by accretion of statutory precedents in a fashion analogous 
to the growth of common law" (p. 45);6 and (4) the practical, consistent ad-
ministrative construction given the statute by the officials charged with its 
administration, thus recognizing that "a statute of broad reach is not a 
finished product the day the legislature adopts it" (p. 45). Hurst summa-
this prior interpretation had, so to speak, frozen the legislative intent for purposes of subse-
quent interpretation of the related provision. 
4. See, e.g., Tate, The Judge's Function and Methodology in Statutory Interpretation, 1 S.U. 
L. REV. 147, 158-59, 167-69 (1981); Tate, The "New" Judicial Solution, 54 TUL. L. REV. 877, 
888-90, 897-900 (1980). 
5. See Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate .Decision and the Rules or Canons 
About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 V AND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950). 
6. "Statutes dealing with a variety of subjects may begin to cluster around some common 
value judgment. Recognizing this reality, a court is warranted in finding evidence of legisla-
tive intent under a given act by reference to what legislators have done regarding like subjects 
under other acts." P. 45. 
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rizes "these several lines of doctrine and practice" by stating that "[t]he 
statutory text is basic and central. But if law is to be a vital force in society, 
the text usually must be seen as part of a flow of policy-making activity that 
originates before the text is voted and continues after it is on the books" (p. 
46). 
Hurst also perceptively discusses the hard problem that sometimes 
arises in reconciling the express wording of a statute (its form) and an appli-
cation thereby directed that seems contrary to or not contemplated by the 
statutory choice of policy-values (the substance). Admitting the theoretical 
difficulty of performing this reconciliation, Hurst suggests that on the rare 
occasions when this is appropriate the courts may be recognizing the reality 
that legislatures "(n]ormally . . . act for limited, or at least specialized 
ends" (p. 52); therefore, it may sometimes be appropriate to go behind the 
words of the statute to the narrowed legislative intent as reflected by the 
legislative history. But this admission is appropriately accompanied by a 
notation of the cautionary limitations (burden of persuasion, alleged ambi-
guity of statute at least as applied, etc.) that demonstrate why, for most 
practical purposes, this approach to statutory construction is discussed more 
often in a classroom than in a courtroom.7 
The final section of this essay on statutory interpretation, "Rules of 
Construction," clears away much dead-maxim timber and charts workable 
rules that are in fact utilized by modem-day courts. These rules are of two 
natures: those that best reflect the realities of the legislative process as most 
consistent with the deference owed the legislature in policy-making, and 
those that explicitly endorse broad value preferences not tied to any partic-
ular statutory subject matter. The former "rules of construction that reflect 
familiar patterns of communication or operations in the legislative process" 
(p. 62) include: customary word usage, indicating either broad or particular 
applications; statutory context -"we read particular words or phrases in 
the light cast by other parts of the same statute" (p. 59) - including excep-
tion clauses; and material in other actions dealing with the same subject or 
the same subject matter - since typically the legislature "is likely to deal at 
one point of time with less than the whole" - so that "legislative intent 
may emerge in full definition only through a succession of acts" (p. 61 ). Of 
the latter type of rules declaring broad policy preferences, Hurst deems 
worthy of mention only the rule requiring strict construction of penal stat-
utes and (surprisingly, at least initially) "the rule (presumption) that a stat-
ute in derogation of common law should be construed as not intended to 
change common law unless that intent is made plain" (p. 62). 
The essay emphasizes, however, that these "rules" are only presump-
tions, casting the burden of persuasion upon those attempting to read a 
statute broadly or to overturn the common law. The presumption may be 
rebutted, for example, by the legislative history or by the explicit choice of 
policy-values represented by the enactment as a whole. After a lifetime of 
scoffing at the rule that a statute in derogation of the common law should 
7. Despite my deprecating remarks, in my own judicial experience I have noted some in-
stances where statutory words literally applied to a changed social or statutory context produce 
results obviously beyond the contemplated legislative intent, so that there is a substantial issue 
whether statutory meaning should be frozen to the original context, and statutory language not 
literally applied to the changed circumstances. See, e.g. , sources cited in note 4 supra. 
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be strictly construed, I find myself persuaded, somewhat reluctantly, by 
Professor Hurst that this construction maxim, if not mechanically applied, 
represents the realities of the legislative process. The legislature normally 
considers only one aspect of a problem, and may not in the least consider 
how its actions might disturb accepted jurisprudential rules related to but 
beyond the scope of the problem alone addressed. 
To use an example from my recent experience, the courts, by consider-
ing this principle, might have avoided some of the confusing, laborious, and 
conflicting opinions associated with the 1972 amendments to the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.8 Prior to the 1972 
amendments, coverage of the Act was restricted to injuries on the navigable 
waters; moreover, all injuries to amphibious non-seamen on the navigable 
waters were regarded as occurring in maritime employment.9 This clear 
delineation had been arrived at, however, only after more than thirty years 
of litigation, during which it was often uncertain whether a land-based 
worker injured on the waters was required to obtain relief through federal 
or state compensation remedies. 10 According to rather specific legislative 
history, the 1972 amendments were designed solely to expand coverage to 
include maritime workers injured in areas adjoining the navigable waters, 
as well as actually upon them; nevertheless, in addition to describing this 
expanded "situs," it became necessary to define those covered by the act as 
only those "engaged in maritime employment" who were injured on the 
expanded situs. 11 
The issue then surfaced as to whether the new statutory "status" test of 
maritime employment excluded amphibious workers injured on the water 
(and, by pre-1972 jurisprudential definition, in maritime employment be-
cause of the navigable water situs). Courts laboriously wrestled with the 
application of this new statutory test in that context. 12 Finally, in its 1982 
en bane decision in Boudreaux v. American Workover, Inc. , 13 the Fifth Cir-
cuit, taking into consideration the complete absence of any contrary legisla-
tive intent and the limited and specific changes expressly intended by the 
Congress, concluded that the new legislative language was not intended to 
change the prior concept of on-water injury to any amphibious worker as 
being in maritime employment for purposes of compensation coverage by 
the Act. 14 It seems to me that much of the confusing, cumbersome, and 
conflicting judicial reasoning might have been avoided, had we followed 
Professor Hurst's analysis based upon the realities of the modem legislative 
8. 33 u.s.c. §§ 901-950 (1978). 
9. See Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114 (1962). 
10. For a summary, see Boudreaux v. American Workover, Inc., 680 F.2d 1034, 1043-45 
(5th Cir. 1982) (en bane) cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3549 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1983) (No. 82-605). 
11. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1978) (as amended in 1972). The legislative history is described in 
Boudreaux, 680 F.2d at 1045-48. 
12. See Boudreaux, 680 F.2d at 1045-48. 
13. 680 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir. 1982) (en bane), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3549 (U.S. Jan. 25, 
1983) (No. 82-605). 
14. To be fair, the Second Circuit reached a conclusion contrary to that of the Fifth Circuit 
in Boudreaux; however, the Supreme Court has subsequently adopted the view of the Fifth 
Circuit. See Churchill v. Perini N. River Assocs., 652 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1981), revd., 51 
U.S.L.W. 4074 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1983) (No. 81-897). 
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process - that we should presume that legislation directed at a narrowed 
issue was not intended to change the pre-existing jurisprudential rules on 
related topics unless that intent is made plain. 
This essay concludes with the following excellent summary of the ap-
proach of modem-day courts to statutory interpretation: 
If we regard together uses judges make of statutory text, legislative his-
tory, and general rules of construction in the second half of the twentieth 
century, one approach is clearly dominant, standing in sharp contrast to 
nineteenth-century treatment oflegislation: The twentieth-century empha-
sis is on coming to a specific focus on a given statute in its full-dimensioned 
particularity of policy, rather than emphasizing material or values not im-
mediately connected to that enactment. Courts now seem usually to strive 
to grasp the distinctive message of statutory words, taken in their own con-
text, with reference to the documented process that produced that particu-
lar act, including legislative history deserving credibility, and policy guides 
supplied by the legislature's successive development of the given policy 
area and related areas. The twentieth-century emphasis thus is not on 
broad, standardized formulas, but on custom-built determinations, fash-
ioned out of materials immediate and special to the legislation at issue. It 
is an approach both more pragmatic and more deferential to the functions 
of courts under the separation of powers. [P. 65.] 
The final essay, ''The Constitutionality of Statutes," "examines key pro-
cedures for achieving the necessary adjustments between constitutional 
grants and limits and exercise of legislative will and choice in making par-
ticular public policy" (p. 68). The essay is an invaluable analysis of current 
theory and practice with regard to judicial review of the constitutionality of 
statutes. The concern is not with substantive content of constitutional law 
but rather ''with the criteria and procedures developed to deal with special 
problems involved in analyzing, briefing, arguing, or deciding questions 
about the constitutionality of legislative action" (p. 68). 
Aside from a brief discussion of the institutional roles of legislators and 
judges, the essay concentrates on the presumption of constitutionality. Re-
lying in part upon an early analysis by Judge Learned Hand, Professor 
Hurst points out that a statute typically (if not always explicitly) embodies 
(a) a goal of what ought to be done for the general interest, based on (b) the 
legislature's actual or supposed appreciation of the present facts that justify 
this end; together with (c) a choice of means of how the goal should be 
accomplished, based (d) (similarly to (b)) upon facts of human behavior or 
human experience relevant to making judgments about the legislative 
choice of ends and means. Since the court is merely a reviewer and must 
constitutionally defer to the legislative originator's choices, those attacking 
the constitutionality of a statute must, in effect, bear the burden of persua-
sion that under no reasonably contemplated set of facts can the legislature's 
choice of ends and means be regarded as other than arbitrary. In discussing 
the application of the presumption, the essay succinctly summarizes its base 
and reach, the weight of the burden of persuasion to be put on the chal-
lenger, the scope of the required rebuttal of the presumption, the influence 
of the state of the record, and the practicability of meeting the burden of 
persuasion on issues of fact or of value relating to the enactment's constitu-
tionality. This relatively brief essay is a primer of central issues that should 
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almost be required reading for legislators, advocates, or judges concerned 
with issues of the constitutionality of statutes. 
The final portion of this essay concerns the development in the latter 
portion of this century of doctrines of stricter scrutiny of statutes when con-
stitutionally preferred values are at issue, such as those that make race a 
criterion to the detriment of a disadvantaged class, those that hinder or 
limit the right to vote, those that explicitly or in practice discriminate 
against interstate commerce, those that burden processes of public commu-
nication, and those that intrude on areas of life that individuals value as of 
private rather than public concern (such as affairs of the family, childbear-
ing, and freedom to practice religion). The six pages (pp. 99-105) that dis-
cuss and critique the workings of preferred-value review once again, as 
throughout the work, afford insights, perspective, and intelligent apprecia-
tion of the central issues and values of the subject. 
The thrust of this essay on judicial review emphasizes that judges in this 
portion of the century have acted with restraint. Even taking into account 
the courts' preferred-value review (to some extent a creation by the judici-
ary of values that it perceives as constitutionally preferred), the relative role 
of the judge in public policy is far from "judicializing the law of the late 
twentieth century" (p. 106). In conclusion, the essay brings into perspective 
the apparent surge in judicial scrutiny of the constitutionality of statutes 
that arguably impinge on preferred values: 
First, judges have not been the only actors on behalf of these values. 
Tardy and cumbersome as it tends to be, the legislative process has also 
contributed, as in legislation increasing access to public records, regulating 
use of money in politics, and enlarging legal protection of civil rights. Sec-
ond, save in the limited instances in which constitutional rules apply, the 
presumption of constitutionality provides the frame within which the va-
lidity of the great bulk of legislation is judged; important as they are, pre-
ferred-value categories apply only to a small part of the whole body of 
statute law. Finally, contests in court carry drama which encourages peo-
ple to exaggerate their range and incidence. The overwhelming bulk of 
statute law and the delegated legislation that exists within a framework of 
statute law never comes into any kind of constitutional litigation. [P. 106.] 
The three essays in Dealing with Statutes, brief but broad in content, 
synthesize with perceptive evaluation the current roles of the legislature and 
the courts in the enactment and application of statutes. The work would be 
invaluable if it did no more than sum up so succinctly the central thrusts in 
the twentieth century toward the primacy of statute law and the underlying 
reasons for the modem changes in the treatment and interpretation of stat-
utes by the courts. The essays, however, are not only a summing-up and 
critique of this nature and of the relevant considerations and key problem 
points of the subject. In this reviewer's opinion, Dealing with Statutes, with 
its fresh insights based upon the realities of today's legislative and judicial 
processes, convincingly discards theoretical approaches mooted by modem 
circumstances and in their place furnishes a theoretical framework for the 
understanding of the ongoing relationship between enacted words, legisla-
tures, and courts that is based upon how and why twentieth-century legisla-
tors and judges actually act in our always-changing society. 
